SUMMARY

As part of its nonproliferation mission, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) notes, “Developing and maintaining the technical means to monitor whether the terms of a nuclear arms control treaty or other international agreement are fulfilled is a critical factor in ensuring that such agreements are successful.” As recognition grows that laser isotope separation (LIS) is commercially feasible, organizations such as the NNSA and IAEA are likely to require means of detecting and inspecting LIS facilities.
It has long been recognized that LIS poses a proliferation risk, since the lower energy requirements and smaller physical parameters associated with its efficiency makes an LIS facility harder to detect. It is therefore necessary to determine novel ways of detecting the existence of an LIS facility and whether material was produced in an LIS facility. This work uses a mathematical model of LIS to determine the likely isotopic ratios in uranium enriched using an LIS process and provides a comparison to the isotopic ratios in centrifuge-enriched uranium. It also uses the model to determine several key operating parameters of an LIS device from the feed, tails, and product streams. This work is combined with an isotopic chronometer, and an analysis of hypothetical samples of enriched uranium is given to demonstrate the qualities of an LIS facility that can be determined solely from the enriched uranium it produces.